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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
FRANK R. HAFEN, : 
Petitioner and Appellant, : 
v. : 
UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS and : 
FRED VAN DER VEUR, 
Respondents and Appellees. 
Case No. 950265-CA 
Priority No. 3 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OP PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Third Judicial 
District Court entered March 17, 1995, granting respondents1 
motion to dismiss petitioner's petition for extraordinary relief 
from a decision of the Utah State Board of Pardons ("Board") . 
Because the petition does not involve a first degree felony, this 
Court has jurisdiction over the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(h) (Supp. 1995). 
ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the district court correctly determine that 
petitioner is not entitled to the additional due process 
protections sought in his petition for his original parole grant 
hearing? 
Standard of Review! On appeal from dismissal of a petition 
for extraordinary relief, the appellate court "accord[s] no 
deference to the conclusions of law that underlie the dismissal. 
1 
They are reviewed for correctness." Neel v. Holdenr 886 P.2d 
1097, 1100 (Utah 1994). 
2. Did the district court correctly conclude that the 
limited retroactivity of Neel v. Holdenr which extended due 
process protections from original -parole grant hearings to 
certain other Board proceedings, does not apply to pending claims 
based on original parole grant hearings? 
Standard of Review: the non-deferential correctness 
standard identified for the first issue applies to this issue as 
well. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ANP RULES 
Defendants do not believe that there are constitutional 
provisions, statutes, or rules determinative of the issues for 
decision. 
STATEMENT OF TEE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings Below 
Plaintiff, an inmate at the Central Utah Correctional 
Facility in Gunnison, Utah, filed a petition for extraordinary 
relief on January 14, 1994, pursuant to Rule 65B(e) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure (R. 2-25). The petition sought relief 
from respondents1 alleged violations of petitioner's due process 
rights in his original parole grant hearing of September 1, 1993 
fid,). Specifically, plaintiff alleged that the Board (1) failed 
to permit him to cross-examine adverse witnesses (R. 3-4, ^ 4a), 
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(2) failed to allow him to call witnesses in his own behalf (R. 4 
at K 4a), (3) failed to permit him to review all information in 
his file (R. 4 at 1 4b), and (4) improperly exceeded the 
sentencing guidelines in determining the applicable time matrix 
(R. 4-5 at 11 4c-e). 
On February 7, 1994, respondents filed a motion to dismiss 
(R. 38-39) and supporting memorandum (R. 40-44) on grounds of (1) 
petitioner's failure to properly serve respondents and (2) 
failure to pay required filing fees or, in the alternative, to 
submit a statement of assets and liabilities for the court's 
determination of the appropriate fee. The motion was denied by 
order of April 11# 1994 (R. 56-58). 
On September 12, 1994, petitioner filed an amended petition 
repeating the claims of the original petition and adding a claim 
based on an asserted right to assistance of counsel (R. 67-77). 
A second motion to dismiss (R. 92-93) and supporting memorandum 
(R. 94-113) were filed on December 15, 1994, under Rule 12(b)(6) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted. This motion was granted by 
order of March 17, 1995 (R. 116-119: Addendum A, attached).1 
Petitioner stated in his brief that "[n]o addendum is 
necessary" (Brief of Appellant at 14). However, under Utah R. 
App. P. 24(a)(11), the addendum to appellant's brief "shall 
contain a copy of . . . (C) those parts of the record on appeal 
that are of central importance to the determination of the 
appeal, such as . . . findings of fact and conclusions of law . . 
. ." Petitioner's challenge to the district court's legal 
conclusions gives central importance to its Conclusions of Law 
and Final Order, and defendants therefore include a copy as an 
addendum to their brief for the Court's reference. 
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Petitioner filed his timely notice of appeal from the order on 
April 14, 1995 (R. 120-21). 
B. Statement of Relevant Facts 
Petitioner, an inmate confined to the Central Utah 
Correctional Facility at Gunnison, Utah, has at all relevant 
times been incarcerated on three terms of not less than one nor 
more than fifteen years for sexual abuse of a child (R. 4, 1 4c; 
8-10; 68, 1 1; 75-77). On September 1, 1993, he came before 
respondent Utah State Board of Pardons for his original parole 
grant hearing and was granted a rehearing date of September, 1997 
(R. 52)• It is undisputed that at the Board hearing, plaintiff 
did not request counsel, ask for information from his file, seek 
to confront or cross-examine witnesses, or attempt to present 
additional evidence or information to the Board (R. 118). 
On December 6, 1993, the Supreme Court of Utah issued its 
opinion in Labrum v. Utah State Board of Pardons. 870 P.2d 902 
(Utah 1993), holding that state constitutional due process 
requires the Board to give an inmate advance notice of the 
information it will be considering in an original parole grant 
hearing. The court expressly limited the reach of its decision 
to original parole grant hearings held on or after December 6, 
1993, the date of the decision, and to claims based on due 
process which were then pending in the district court or on 
appeal. Plaintiff's original parole grant hearing predated the 
Labrum decision (R. 52), and his petition had not yet been filed 
(R. 2). 
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On January 14, 1994, petitioner filed luy peUl ion for 
extraordinary relief, claiming due process violations by the 
Boar^ • . ' •. • grant hearing IK 2•2 51 , During the 
pendency of the case, r h* supreme court decided Neel v^ Hidden, " 
case involving alleged violations of due process by the Board in 
post- i» vuL-dl i [hiiuh.' qi.i i proceedings (R. 108-113 The Neel 
court applied the due process protections granted uabrum 
original parole grant hearings to all Board hearings fixing 
extending pdtuh ri,iMM- i/uini i- xtended ne benefits * its decision 
to inmates with claims similar to Neel's then penc 
state courts (R. 113). Petitioner's claim, though pending, was 
dissimilar to Net11 ' ,'• ," i ' '» it, ii raised rinp process issues only 
with respect to his original parole grant hearing. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Petitioner argues that the Board unlawfully deprived him 
va i: :i oi .s cii ne process rights .* \:')<* original parole grant hearing. 
However, the undisputed t show that 
he failed to request the Board to provide any of the procedural 
safeguards sought in his petition. By failing to raise these 
claims to the hutud, p»-l iL iuiiti waived t heiii I i purposes oi 
further litigation, and the district court correctly dismissed 
them. 
Because his peti L the 
Labrum decision, petitioner concedes that is *. „ ^ cause 
c based solely on the procedural rights Labrum granted 
with respect to original parole grant hearings. However, he 
argues that the pendency of the petition at the time of the Neel 
decision permits reopening of claims based on his original parole 
grant hearing because it is a Board hearing at which a parole 
date is fixed or extended. His argument fails to recognize that 
his claim, based only on an original parole grant hearing and 
governed by Labrum's general nonretroactivity provision, is not 
similar to the post-revocation hearing claim adjudicated in Heal. 
He points to no language in U££l that suggests an intent by the 
court to override LabrumTs limited retrospective application in 
original parole grant cases. In fact, petitioner's expansive 
interpretation of He^l would provide the very windfall benefit 
that the Labrum court sought to avoid: the reopening of cases in 
which no actual prejudice has been suffered. As the district 
court correctly held, this result is warranted neither by law nor 
by the undisputed facts of petitioner's case. 
POINT I 
BY FAILING TO BRING HIS DUE PROCESS CLAIMS BEFORE THE 
BOARD, PETITIONER HAS WAIVED HIS OPPORTUNITY TO 
LITIGATE THEM. 
On appeal, petitioner argues that the district court 
incorrectly dismissed his claims asserting various due process 
rights, including the right to be represented by counsel, to 
cross-examine witnesses, to call witnesses, and to present 
evidence at his original parole grant hearing (aae. Brief of 
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Appellant at 3-4) However, as the district court found, 
Petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedies 
available to him at the time of his hearing and did not 
request the additional procedural safeguards that he 
now seeks from the Court. Specifically, it is 
undisputed that Petitioner failed to request counsel, 
failed to ask for the information in his file, failed 
to seek cross-examination or confrontation of 
witnesses, failed to present additional evidence or 
information at his hearing. Furthermore, Petitioner 
has failed to demonstrate how the lack of these 
additional procedures negatively affected the outcome 
of the Board*s decision in his case. Finally, 
petitioner has failed to identify any false information 
relied upon by the Board in reaching its decision even 
though he has been provided a copy of the Boardfs file. 
R. 118. Nothing in petitioner's brief points to record 
disput. i IN Lhej !t,; lacts Because petitioner undisputedly failed to 
bring his due process claims .-ic; iias> waived them 
for purposes : ! litigation. 
3 uexu, is axiomatic in our adversary 
system that a party must raise - • earlier 
proceeding or waive its right Litigate the issue in subsequent 
proceed I rig s , BiiiiKerhofl y^ Schwendiman, 7 - " P.2d 587, 589 
(Utah App. 1990) Moreover, |t|his pr IM. - limited to 
the trial court setting, but applies equally administrative 
hearings." Id, Mv.s'.-nl this requirement, the administrative 
forum would be deprived of. 11 :•« upf nn i mi i \
 } m ( m i pet alleged 
errors the proceedings, leading to unnecessary and protracted 
litigai 
As an administrative forum, .-r •» . ven the 
first opportunity • correct alleged errors in proceedings before 
•**" i1, n bjections before the Board, petitioner 
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has deprived the Board of its rightful opportunity to address 
those objections and has waived his right to litigate them in 
subsequent proceedings. The district court therefore correctly 
dismissed petitioner's claims, and he has given no grounds for 
reversal of its decision. 
POINT II 
PETITIONER HAS SHOWN NEITHER RECORD FACTS NOR LEGAL 
PRECEDENT SUPPORTING THE RIGHTS HE ASSERTS. 
In his brief to this Court, petitioner specifically 
addresses only his asserted rights to representation by counsel 
and to confrontation of adverse witnesses in his original parole 
grant hearing. For neither of these claimed rights does he 
provide support in record facts or binding precedent; in fact, he 
fails to acknowledge this Court's favorable recognition of 
contrary views. 
A. Right to Representation by Counsel 
As to representation by counsel, petitioner states without 
supporting argument or precedent that denial of counsel at his 
original parole grant hearing "violates due process under Article 
I, Section 7, Constitution of Utah" (Brief of Appellant at 9). 
In Neelf the supreme court rejected a requirement for 
representation by counsel in parole hearings under article I, 
section 7. As the court explained, 
the touchstone of due process in the context of parole 
hearings is whether the proposed procedural due process 
requirement substantially furthers the accuracy and 
reliability of the Board's fact-finding process. In 
light of this rationale and because Neel has failed to 
show how the further participation of counsel at the 
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hearing would have affected the accuracy of the 
information considered by the Board, we do not find 
that Neel was denied due process by the Board's refusal 
to allow Neel!s counsel to address the Board. 
Xfefil, 886 P.2d at 1103. 
Like Neel, petitioner has failed to show how participation 
of counsel would have affected the accuracy ''f the internal ion 
the Board considered in his case. He argues only in general that 
"[w]it inmate has little chance of 
effectively presenting his case to the BoartJ"" IMI U-I ui" ftpji^Hrmt 
at .,/ . A counterargument was given credence by the Neel court: 
We do note that the argument has been made that 
attorney representation in parole grant hearings would 
only inhibit the Board!s efforts to evaluate prisoners1 
rehabilitative progress, and would, in the interests of 
fairness, necessitate attorney representation of the 
State's interests as well, ultimately resulting in 
parole hearings encumbered by costly and time-consuming 
trial procedures. We have no desire to turn these 
hearings into adversarial or confrontational exercises 
when there is not a clear showing of a need to do so. 
Therefore, we view somewhat skeptically the suggestion 
that attorneys should be permitted to address the Board 
on their client's behalf in parole hearings. 
Neelf 886 P.2d 1103, n.7 (citation omitted). 
Having held against a state constitutional right to counsel, 
the court further i IM-U l i \\t> l h i i t - < ^  states Supreme Court has 
rejected a federal constitutional right to counsel in r 
revocations and reasoned that M[i]f the Sixth Amendment does not 
guarantee parole revocation hearing, •._ 
certainly does not guarantee that right in an offender . ..1 
post-revocation parole grant hearing." IdL at 1104. Because the 
Neel court found st-revocation 
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hearings analogous to those implicated in original parole grant 
hearings, the same logic applies to petitioner's case. Under 
neither state nor federal constitutional analysis does petitioner 
have a right to representation by counsel in an original parole 
grant hearing. 
Petitioner has offered nothing to rebut the supreme court's 
well-placed skepticism regarding counsel participation in parole 
grant hearings. The absence of legal precedent or record facts 
establishing a constitutional right to counsel, or showing that 
participation by counsel is necessary to accurate and reliable 
decisionmaking in original parole grant hearings, affords no 
grounds for reversal of the district courtfs correct decision. 
B. Right to Confront Adverse Witnesses 
Petitioner admits that even "the United States Supreme Court 
has not held that the right to confrontation applies to 
sentencing. . ." (Brief of Appellant at 11). Nonetheless, he 
suggests that the right of confrontation is fundamental to due 
process before the Board. He states without factual or legal 
support that "[t]he right to confrontation should apply to any 
witness who appears before the Board of [sic] who gives evidence" 
(Brief of Appellant at 12). He cites to State v. Lipskyf 608 
P.2d 1241 (Utah 1980), to bolster his proposition that "where a 
defendant challenges the accuracy of a report, his ability to 
confront the witnesses becomes of paramount importance" (Brief of 
Appellant at 12). Lipsky cannot bear the weight with which 
petitioner burdens it. 
10 
Lipsky dealt with the issue of whether a criminal defendant 
must be given access at the time of sentencing to a presentence 
report prepared - a Parole agency. 
Holding that fundamental fairness mandates disclosure, i ii' 
supreme court explicitly declined to find a right of 
confrontation, stating that 
the trial court may receive information concerning the 
defendant in the form of a pre-sentence report without 
the author of the report necessarily personally 
appearing and testifying in open court. , . . If the 
defendant thinks the report inaccurate, he should then 
have the opportunity to bring such inaccuracies to the 
courtfs attention 
Lips.^ JL * L -L^ -*** Rather than supporting the right c~ 
confrontation that petit. : iggests that other 
means of rebutting perceived inaccuracies satisfy the imperatives 
I furn-lament-H"I fairness and due process. 
This Court acknowledged as '« i P L A ! > " as the 
requirements of due process are limited in sentencing 
proceed . .:e m parole hearings at which an inmate's 
predicted term of incarceration " Nee' f.za at 
1103. A "ootnote to this statement sets out Lipsky and two other 
crimin - .  -* * - n Ini cases to show that confrontation and cross-
examination are not required. It iilfiit jfu-'ii J^ ipslty as "holding 
that while defendant should be given opportunity to bring 
inaccuraiiPS contained in presentence report 'o court's 
attention, this may be done \ • -: * personally 
appearing and testifying in open court : ^ ^ , 886 P. 2d 
3 State v. Sanwickr 713 P.2d 707 (Utah 
11 
1986), which denied cross-examination of victims whose statements 
were contained in a presentence report, and State v. Rhodesf 818 
P.2d 1048 (Utah App. 1991), "denying defendant's motion for 
continuance of sentencing to obtain more favorable evidence by 
cross-examination and holding that due process rights in 
sentencing are satisfied by affording defendants opportunity to 
examine and contest accuracy of factual statements contained in 
reports before sentencing court." Neelr 886 P.2d 1103, n.6 
(parentheses omitted). Petitioner's brief does not discuss the 
Court's favorable citation of these precedents in U££l or suggest 
reasons for not applying them to the facts of his case. 
Significantly, the cases cited in He^l deny a right to 
confrontation in criminal sentencing proceedings involving new 
deprivations of liberty; the contested Board proceedings, by 
contrast, involve defendants whose liberty interests are 
diminished by present incarceration. Petitioner has given no 
reason why his diminished interest warrants greater protection 
than the courts have granted for criminal sentencing. By leaving 
unaddressed the Court's reference to these precedents, he has 
provided no reasoned analysis for a different outcome in his case 
and has pointed to no factual or legal grounds on which to 
distinguish it. The lack of an articulated rationale gives no 
basis for reversal of the district court's dismissal. 
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POINT III 
JSEEL'S LIMITED RETROACTIVITY DOES NOT APPLY TO CASES 
SUCH AS PETITIONER'S WHICH RAISE CLAIMS RELATED ONLY TO 
ORIGINAL PAROLE GRANT HEARINGS. 
As petitioner correctly recognizes (see Brief of Appellant 
at 13), he cannot base his claims on the procedural due process 
protections granted in Labrum because his case does not fall 
under its limited retroactivity provisions: his original parole 
grant hearing took place before Labrum was decided, and his 
petition was not pending on the date of the decision. However, 
he contends that the claims barred by Labrum are revived by Kael. 
He bases his argument on the Jiesl court's statement that 
today's decision applies only to those parole grant 
hearings held on or after the date of this decision. 
We extend the benefits of this decision to David Neel 
and to any inmate who currently has a similar claim 
pending in the district court or on appeal before this 
court or the court of appeals. 
Neelf 886 P.2d at 1105. The unexpressed rationale of 
petitioner's argument appears to be that this language from the 
Neel decision does not explicitly exclude original parole grant 
hearings from the class of "parole grant hearings," and that the 
pendency of his petition challenging an original parole grant 
hearing when Neel was decided places him within ELe^ l's 
retroactivity for pending similar claims. 
Petitioner's argument ignores the context of Neel. K££l is 
an expansion, not a reconsideration, of Labrum. It did not 
revisit the due process rights of inmates in the context of 
original parole grant hearings. It merely extended the rights 
13 
granted in Labrum to an analogous class of Board hearings- As 
the Neel court explained, "Neel argues that his post-revocation 
parole grant hearing is analogous to the original parole grant 
hearing in Labrum and# therefore, he was equally entitled to due 
process protection. We agree and conclude that the general 
principles articulated in Labrum are applicable here as well." 
886 P.2d at 1101. Instead of limiting the expansion of Labrum 
rights exclusively to the post-revocation setting, the court 
chose to extend its holding to all hearings that are analogous to 
original parole grant hearings in that "an inmate's release date 
is fixed or extended." Id. To suggest that the court could 
extend Labrum protections to a category of hearings which, being 
governed by Labrum, already enjoys them is defiant of logic. 
The Labrum court made clear its intention not to "force the 
Board to rehear proceedings which did not offend due process and 
resulted in entirely fair and accurate parole determinations." 
Labrum, 870 P.2d at 913. It expressed a concern that retroactive 
application of its decision could "'occasion windfall benefits 
for some defendants who have suffered no constitutional 
deprivation.1" U L . at 912, siting Michigan v, Payne. 412 U.S. 
47, 53 (1973). Therefore, for collateral suits by inmates 
lacking pending cases on Labrum issues or without post-Labrum 
hearing dates, the court required an evidentiary showing of "some 
evidence that the Board violated their rights to due process in 
their original parole grant hearing" fLabrum, 902 P.2d at 913) 
other than by denying the procedural safeguards Labrum granted. 
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As the district court found in the present case# petitioner has 
made no such showing: "he has not demonstrated with specificity 
how the alleged violations harmed or prejudiced his particular 
case" (R. 117) . 
H££l adopted the Labrum retroactivity analysis, but did not 
purport to apply it to cases already governed by Labrum. It 
limited retroactive application "to David Neel and to any inmate 
who currently has a similar claim pending in the district court 
or on appeal before this court or the court of appeals." Heel, 
886 P.2d at 1105. Neel's claim, involving a Board hearing 
analogous to an original parole grant hearing, is not similar to 
petitionees claim, involving the original parole grant hearing 
itself. To find that Hasl opens a window for consideration of 
petitioner's claims without the requisite evidentiary showing 
under Labrum would be to provide the very windfall benefit the 
Labrum court sought to avoid. It is disingenuous to suggest that 
the supreme court would intend such a result without saying so 
explicitly. 
Moreover, even if Neel afforded petitioner review of his 
claims, it rejected the very due process protections that he 
seeks on appeal. It explicitly denied a constitutionally 
mandated right to counsel and declined to require a procedural 
safeguard where no prejudice had been shown. While Neel did not 
seek a right of confrontation, the court, by favorably citing 
Lipsky, Sanwick, and Rhodes (s££ Point IIB, supra), implicitly 
ruled that confrontation in the setting of parole grant hearings 
15 
is not constitutionally required. Even if petitioner were 
"afforded all the rights contained" in the Neel decision (Brief 
of Appellant at 14), his claims on appeal would not be answered. 
Therefore, his invocation of Uael is unavailing. 
The district court found, and petitioner does not dispute, 
that "[p]etitioner only challenges the actions of the Board at 
his original parole grant hearing. He does not challenge the 
actions of the Board during a rehearing or other subsequent 
hearing" (R. 117). Based on these undisputed facts, the court 
correctly concluded that Labrumf not E££l, governs this case. 
Petitioner's contorted interpretation of Neel would flood the 
courts with litigation and "'work a fundamental injustice on the 
Board, the judiciary, and the citizens of this state'" in 
contradiction to the supreme court's stated policy. K££l# 886 
P.2d at 1105, citing Labrumr 870 P.2d at 913. Affirmance of the 
district court's decision holding N££l retroactivity inapplicable 
to petitioner's case is vital to maintaining fairness for both 
inmates and the state. 
CONCLUSION 
By invoking H££l retroactivity to assert a Labrum claim, 
petitioner seeks to open a Pandora's box of unwarranted 
litigation. Because he has neither made the key factual showing 
of harm required by Labrum nor identified any key precedential 
rulings to support the rights he asserts, his appeal must fail. 
Moreover, his failure to present his claims to the Board in the 
16 
first instance waived their further litigation, and the district 
court properly dismissed them. 
For the reasons discussed above, defendants respectfully 
request the Court to affirm the district court's dismissal of the 
petition in this case. 
REQUEST RE QRAIJ ARGUMENT MP/OR PUBLISHED OPINION 
Defendants do not believe oral argument is necessary to the 
disposition of the issues for decision, but desire to participate 
if argument is ordered by the Court. Defendants do not request a 
published opinion in this case. 
(\4L Dated this ll~^U^ day of August, 1995. 
Nancy L. Kemp 
Assistant Attorney General 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK R. HAFEN, 
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The above-entitled matter came before this Court on March 6, 
1995, to consider Petitioner's amended petition for extraordinary 
relief and Respondents' motion to dismiss. Petitioner was present 
and represented by counsel David C. Anderson. Respondents were 
represented by Lorenzo K. Miller, Assistant Attorney General. The 
Court having reviewed the documents and pleadings in this case and 
having heard argument by the parties, issues the following 
Conclusions and Order: 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
On January 14, 1994, Petitioner filed the instant petition for 
extraordinary relief claiming that the Utah Board of Pardons had 
denied him of various alleged due process rights at his original 
parole hearing held September 21, 1993. Petitioner does not allege 
that he requested the desired procedural protections from the Board 
prior to this litigation, and he has not demonstrated with 
specificity how the alleged violations harmed or prejudiced his 
particular case. Instead, Petitioner relies on Neel v. Holden. 886 
P.2d 1015 (Utah 1994), to support his claims. 
For the following reasons, the Court concludes Petitioner's 
claims fall outside the protections given in both Neel and Labrum 
v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons. 870 P.2d 902 (Utah 1993): 
1. Petitioner was heard by the Board prior to the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision in Lab rum, and he did not file this action 
until after that decision was rendered by the court. Therefore, 
the application of Lab rum to this case was specifically excluded by 
the court in that decision. 
2. Petitioner only challenges the actions of the Board at his 
original parole grant hearing. He does not challenge the actions 
of the Board during a rehearing or other subsequent hearing. 
Therefore, the Labrum decision applies to this case, not the 
retroactivity provisions of Neel. 
2 00117 
With this in mind, the Court concludes that Petitioner must 
support his claims with other arguments relating to the fairness of 
the proceedings in his specific case. After reviewing Petitioner's 
petition, the Court concludes that Petitioner did not exhaust 
administrative remedies available to him at the time of his hearing 
and did not request the additional procedural safeguards that he 
now seeks from the Court. Specifically, it is undisputed that 
Petitioner failed to request counsel, failed to ask for the 
information in his file, failed to seek cross-examination or 
confrontation of witnesses, failed to present additional evidence 
or information at his hearing. Furthermore, Petitioner has failed 
to demonstrate how the lack of these additional procedures 
negatively affected the outcome of the Board's decision in his 
case. Finally, Petitioner has failed to identify any false 
information relied upon by the Board in reaching its decision even 
though he has been provided a copy of the Board's file. 
Wherefore the Court concludes the Petitioner is not entitled 
to the additional protections requested in the petition or those 




BASED on the above, it is hereby ordered that Respondent's 
Motion to Dismiss is granted and the relief requested in 
Petitioner's Second Amended Petition for Extraordinary Relief is 
denied. This action is dismissed with prejudice. 
-ft 
DATED this 11 -""day of March, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to form: 
;
^ ^ 
LE KENNETH RI^TRUP 
istrict judicial Judge 
David C. Anderson 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the / ^ day of March, 1995, I 
caused to be mailed postage prepaid, the unsigned original, 
attached CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND FINAL ORDER to: 
DAVID C. ANDERSON 
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 
505 EAST 200 SOUTH, SUITE 400 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
^^K^fe^, lfa^C4^ 
00119 
